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Abstract. We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for
viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can
influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs:
a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards
for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (ex-
ploit connections). The problem is to determine the optimal timing of
these programs over a finite time horizon. In contrast to algorithmic per-
spective popular in the literature, we take a mean-field approach and
formulate the problem as a continuous-time deterministic optimal con-
trol problem. We show that the optimal strategy for the seller has a
simple structure and can take both forms, namely, influence-and-exploit
and exploit-and-influence. We also show that in some cases it may op-
timal for the seller to deploy incentive programs mostly for low degree
nodes. We support our theoretical results through numerical studies and
provide practical insights by analyzing various scenarios.
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1 Introduction
A key research topic in multi-agent systems is to understand the effect of mi-
crodynamics/interactions between agents on macroscopic properties. Often the
agents are a part of a social structure such as a social network. A common ex-
ample is that of a social network that consists of potential buyers of a particular
new product offering in the market. These buyers interact with each other and
influence each others’ purchase decisions through word-of-mouth and/or behav-
ior. This so-called social influence exerted by agents on their neighboring agents
in the network have a significant role to play in generating a network effect on
the sales of the product. The idea of viral marketing is to essentially exploit the
(macroscopic) network effects that result due to the microdynamics between the
agents in the network.
Viral marketing is receiving much attention by practicing marketers and aca-
demics alike. While not a new idea, it has come to the forefront because of multi-
ple effects - products have become more complex, making buyers to increasingly
rely on opinions of their peers; consumers have evolved to distrust advertising;
and Web2.0 has revolutionized the way people can connect, communicate and
share. With power shifting to consumers, it has become important for sellers
to devise effective viral marketing strategies [8]. This work is motivated by this
urgent need.
For social influence to work, there must be seeds, i.e., product advocates to
start with. The sellers, therefore, employ two basic strategies. The first is to
create advocates, by providing incentives to potential buyers to make an actual
purchase. These incentives are typically in the form of discounts, free goodies,
etc. The second is to reward product advocates who ‘put in a good word’ and
influence potential buyers to make the purchase. Thus, the latter program helps
to exploit the impact of social influence while making a purchasing decision
whereas the former program helps to directly influence the buying behavior by
offering discounts.
Since incentives come at a cost, a seller must balance the revenue she gener-
ates through these strategies and the expenditure she incurs in doing so. This
poses some non-trivial challenges. The first is determining incentives themselves,
since response of an individual is contingent on them (too low a referral reward
may not elicit recommendation from an individual since personal reputation is
usually at stake). Secondly, the two programs are not necessarily causally con-
nected. The reputation of a firm or a brand might create product advocates
without incentives, thereby, requiring a seller to launch a referral program di-
rectly. This necessitates careful ‘timing’ of these programs.
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on this practically important
and theoretically interesting problem. In particular, we seek to determine an
optimal timing of these programs over a finite time horizon.
1.1 Related Work
In recent years, problems such as these have attracted much attention. Several
papers investigate ‘influence maximization’ (see, for example, Domingos and
Richardson [7], Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos [11], Bharathi, Kempe, and Salek
[4], Chen, Yaun, and Zhang [6]), where the problem is to determine the set
of initial adopters who, through an influence process, can maximize the future
adoptions of the product. Auriol and Benaim [2] discuss a dynamic model of how
standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies. Hartline, Mirrokni, and
Sundararajan [10], Arthur, Motwani, Sharma, and Xu [1] consider the problem of
‘revenue maximization’ for viral marketing and are close in spirit to the problem
we consider in this paper.
In Hartline et al. [10] a model is proposed in which the purchase decision
of a buyer is influenced by individuals who own the product and the price at
which the product is offered. An optimal pricing policy is derived using dynamic
programming in a symmetric setting (i.e., identical buyers). In a general setting,
finding an optimal strategy is shown to be NP-hard and approximation algo-
rithms are considered. The authors suggest influence-and-exploit strategy where
selected buyers are given the product for free, and the seller extracts revenue
by making a random sequence of offers and a greedy pricing strategy for the
remaining buyers to compensate for the initial loss.
Arthur et al. [1] also considers a model in which a buyer’s decision is influ-
enced by friends who own the product and price at which the product is offered.
Sales are assumed to cascade through the social network. The seller offers cash-
back to recommenders and also sets price for each buyer. The authors show that
determining an optimal strategy to maximize expected revenue is NP-hard and
propose a non-adaptive influence-and-exploit policy, which offers product to the
interior nodes of the max-leaf spanning tree of the network for free and later ex-
ploits their influence by extracting more revenue from the leaf nodes of the tree.
They show that the expected revenue generated from the non-adaptive strategy
is within a constant factor of the optimal revenue from an adaptive strategy.
1.2 Our Contributions
We consider a seller interested in selling a product to a population of N agents.
The product is assumed to be durable and free from network externalities. From
the seller’s perspective, each agent assumes one of the following types at any
point in time: potential buyer (one who is yet to make a purchase), customer
(one who has purchased the seller’s product) and competitor’s customer (one
who has purchased a competing product3). A potential buyer makes a purchase
decision of her own volition (essentially under external influence) or under so-
cial influence. This decision-making is modeled probabilistically, by specifying
for both products (the seller’s and the competitor’s), probabilities of purchase
under external influence and social influence. The seller can influence the former
through direct incentives (which affect the price) and the latter through referral
rewards. The problem she faces is to roll out these programs so as to maximize
the profit, which is equal to the revenue obtained by customer acquisition mi-
nus the expenditure on direct incentives and referral rewards, over a given time
horizon T .
In practice sellers have limited knowledge about the social network underlying
the population, typically, in the form of a class-level statistical description of it.
A class comprises agents who are considered essentially identical on a variety
of factors (chosen by the seller), such as demographic, economic level, number
of social contacts and so on. In this paper we consider this set-up. However to
keep it simple, we assume heterogeneity only in terms of network connections
(in particular, probabilities of purchase under either external or social influence
are assumed to be the same for all agents); hence classes are based only on
the number of social contacts (degrees). The seller thus knows only the degree
distribution and degree-degree correlation of the social network.
3 All competitors are aggregated into one single virtual competitor.
This class-level statistical description of the agent population allows us to
approximate the stochastic evolution of the purchase dynamics by a deterministic
process described by ordinary differential equations (ODEs). This is formally
established as a mean-field limit, taking the number of agents N →∞ [3]. With
an ODE limit, we pose the problem as a continuous time optimal control problem
and employ the well known Pontryagin’s Maximum principle [12] to characterize
an optimal control. An optimal control specifies for each class the times at which
direct incentives and referral rewards programs are to be executed. The following
are our main results.
1. We show that an optimal control has a simple structure: the seller needs to
run each of the programs at most twice for a certain duration. Moreover,
it is non-adaptive (or open-loop). This simplifies the implementation and
practically can help a seller pre-allocate the budget for her campaign.
2. While influence-and-exploit strategy turns out to be optimal when social
influence is strong in the population, exploit-and-influence strategy can be
optimal when the seller has a good reputation.
3. In some settings, the seller may be better off incentivizing low degree nodes
as against the popular approach of targeting the influentials (high degree
nodes). This, we believe, provides some support to the findings reported in
[14] in reference to the influentials hypothesis.
The approach we have taken to address the problem is entirely different
from the ones in the literature. While a large size of the population presents a
challenge to the earlier approaches, it, in fact, aids us in migrating to a simpler
deterministic description of the dynamics. The assumption that agents of a class
are indistinguishable also fits in naturally with the popular marketing approach
of customer segmentation and allows a seller to customize incentives and referral
rewards as per these segments.
In contrast to earlier papers, we have also modeled competition. This is not
only close to reality but interestingly it allows to address some problems in com-
pletely different contexts. For example, in limiting the spread of misinformation
about an entity or an Internet virus, the objective is to maximize nodes with
correct information or security patches by immunizing them (akin to direct in-
centives) and/or incentivizing them to spread the information they have to their
neighbors (akin to referrals). Our results are, thus, applicable to these problems
as well (see [5] for discussion of the influence limitation problem).
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a population of N agents, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The underlying
social network is specified by an undirected graph G = (V , E). Each agent is
identified with a node in V and (i, j) ∈ E means that i and j are social contacts
and they influence each other in decision-making.
si denotes the state of agent i. si can take three values: 0 (indicates potential
buyer), 1 (indicates customer) and −1 (indicates competitor’s customer). Let
s := (s1, s2, . . . , sN).
Each agent makes the purchase decision at a random time point, independent
of all others. It suffices to assume that time is discrete (denoted by n = 1, 2, . . .)
and at each time step, an agent is chosen uniformly randomly from the popu-
lation for a potential state change. Since there are no repeat purchases, 1 and
−1 are absorbing states. Therefore, the state change occurs only if the chosen
agent is a potential buyer. Suppose agent i is chosen at a time n. Then one of
the following happens if i is a potential buyer.
1. i buys the seller’s product on her own with probability α (For example,
α = 0.08 means that there is 8% chance that a potential buyer will buy the
seller’s product on her own).
2. i buys the competitor’s product on her own with probability δ.
3. i selects one of her social contacts at random. If the selected contact is a
customer, i buys the seller’s product under social influence with probability
β (For example, β = 0.1 means that there is 10% chance that a potential
buyer will buy the seller’s product if she interacts with someone who has
already bought the product).
4. i selects one of her social contacts at random. If the selected contact is a
competitor’s customer, i buys the competitor’s product under social influ-
ence with probability γ.
Clearly, the state process {s(n), n ≥ 1} is a Markov chain.
Now from the seller’s perspective, agents having the same degree are indis-
tinguishable and the network G is known only statistically, i.e., G is drawn from
an ensemble of random undirected graphs of size N , a given degree distribu-
tion P (k) (1 ≤ k ≤ K) and degree-degree correlation function P (k′|k), which
denotes the probability that a given link from a node of degree k is to a node
of degree k′. Note that a number of well-known graphs such as homogeneous
random graphs, exponential random graphs (e.g., G(n, p) and Watts-Strogatz
network), scale-free networks can be represented in this framework. We assume
that K remains uniformly bounded as N →∞.
Denote by ik, rk and θk the fraction of degree-k agents who are potential buy-
ers, customers and competitor’s customers respectively (note that normalization
is with respect to the number of class-k agents; hence ik + rk + θk = 1). Let
xk := (ik, rk, θk) and x := (x1, . . . , xK). From the above assumption, it follows
that {x(n), n ≥ 1} is a Markov chain (as seen by the seller).
The drift of x can be computed considering the four cases described above.
Table 1 shows the corresponding probabilities and the change in xk for degree
class-k. Consider as an example Case 3. The probability of a randomly selected
agent being a potential customer of degree k is P (k)ik. This agent randomly
chooses one of her k social contacts. The probability that this chosen one is
an existing customer is 1
k
∑k
j=1
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|k)rk′ =
∑
k′∈K P (k
′|k)rk′ . The selected
agent buys the seller’s product under the social influence from her contact with
probability β. Thus the probability of Case 3 is βP (k)ik
∑
k′∈K P (k
′|k)rk′ . One
agent changes her state from 0 (potential customer) to 1 (customer). Hence the
effect on xk is
1
NPk
(−1, 1, 0).
We now make the dependence on the population size N explicit and denote
by FN (x) := [FNk (x)]
K
k=1 the drift of x. F
N
k (x) is as follows.
1
N

−βik
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|k)rk′−γik
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|k)θk′−(α+δ)ik
βik
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|k)rk′+αik
γik
∑
k′∈K P (k
′|k)θk′+δik


Observe that (i) the number of transitions per agent per time slot is of the
order of 1N (ii) the second moment of number of agent transitions per time
slot is bounded and (iii) FN (x) is a smooth function of 1N and x. Let F (x) =
limN→∞
FN (x)
1/N . It then follows from Theorem 1 of [3] that the time evolution
of x(n) can be approximated by the following system of ODEs (with the same
initial conditions).
x˙ = F (x) (1)
More explicitly, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K
i˙k = −βikRk − γikΘk − (α+ δ)ik
r˙k = βikRk + αik
θ˙k = γikΘk + δik
where, Rk :=
∑
k′∈K P (k
′|k)rk′ and Θk :=
∑
k′∈K P (k
′|k)θk′ .
The seller offers direct incentives and referral rewards to increase α and
β respectively. We model this as follows. A referral reward of c results in an
increase of ǫ1 in β and a direct incentive of c
′ causes α to increase by ǫ2. Thus,
for the duration of the referral reward program, social influence rate of (β+ǫ1) is
operational and the seller incurs a cost of c for every successful referral. Similarly,
Case Probability Effect on xk
1 αP (k)ik
1
NPk
(−1, 1, 0)
2 δP (k)ik
1
NPk
(−1, 0, 1)
3 βP (k)ik
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|k)rk′
1
NPk
(−1, 1, 0)
4 γP (k)ik
∑
k′∈K
P (k′|k)θk′
1
NPk
(−1, 0, 1)
Table 1. Probability and effect on xk for different cases
if the direct incentive program is executed for some duration, the take-rate for
seller’s product increases to (α+ ǫ2) for that duration, incurring her a cost of c
′
for every sale. We normalize c and c′ with respect to the product price. Thus the
price is fixed to 1. The seller’s problem of maximizing her profit (revenue minus
cost) over a fixed time horizon T by optimally timing the two program can now
be stated formally as follows.
Let uk(t) (resp. vk(t)) denote the control variable indicating whether or not
the referral reward program (resp. direct incentive program) is offered to class-k
at time t. The cost incurred in running the referral reward program is
∫ T
0
K∑
k=1
P (k)uk(t)c(β + ǫ1)ik(t)Rk(t)dt (2)
Recall that the conversion rate of potential buyers under the program is c(β +
ǫ1)ik(t)Rk(t). The cost incurred in the direct incentives program is
∫ T
0
K∑
k=1
P (k)vk(t)c
′(α+ ǫ2)ik(t)dt (3)
Since the product price is unity, the revenue obtained is proportional to the
number of customers at the end of horizon,
∑K
k=1 P (k)rk(T ). Denoting the total
cost (2)+(3) by C(T ) the problem is
Maximize
K∑
k=1
P (k)rk(T )− C(T )
subject to
i˙k = −(β + ukǫ1)ikRk − (α+ vkǫ2)ik − γikΘk − δik
r˙k = (β + ukǫ1)ikRk + (α+ vkǫ2)ik
θ˙k = γikΘk + δik
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K and a given initial condition x(0).
Three remarks are in order. The assumption of heterogeneity only in the
number of social contacts is mainly to keep the formulation simple and high-
light the impact of network structure. Extending this formulation to a general
setting is straightforward and will be taken up in a longer version of the paper.
Our random interaction model essentially means that the social influence on a
potential buyer is the average influence from her neighbors. This, we believe, is
reasonable since we have also assumed presence of external influence (through
α) on agents4. In the above formulation we consider fixed rewards and incentives
pay-outs (c and c′). This simplifies implementation in practice. Calibration of c
and c′ can be carried out through numerical studies.
4 For the lack of clear empirical evidence, one may also consider total influence from
the neighbors. Mathematically, it is a simple modification to our formulation.
3 Structure of Optimal Control
In this section we mathematically prove the structural properties of an optimal
control. To keep the proof simple, we will assume that the network G is drawn
randomly from a set of regular networks of size N and degree k. This is without
loss of generality.
Let i(t), r(t) and θ(t) denote the fraction of population in states {0, 1,−1} at
time t respectively. Let u(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether or not the referral reward
program is offered at time t and let v(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether or not the
direct incentive program is offered at time t. The purchase dynamics under the
influence of these programs are given as follows:
i˙ = −(β + uǫ1)ir − (α+ vǫ2)i− γiθ − δi (4)
r˙ = (β + uǫ1)ir + (α+ vǫ2)i (5)
θ˙ = γiθ + δi (6)
From (4), (5), and (6), observe that i˙ + r˙ + θ˙ = 0. Therefore, it suffices
to consider any two equations. Let Ω := {(i, r)|i + r ≤ 1, i ≥ 0, r ≥ 0}. Let
x(t) := (i(t), r(t)) ∈ Ω denote the state variable.
The optimal control problem in this simpler setting is as follows.
Maximize r(T )−
∫ T
0
cu(t)(β + ǫ1)i(t)r(t)dt
−
∫ T
0
c′v(t)(α + ǫ2)i(t))dt (7)
subject to (4), (5) and the following constraints on state and control variables:
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T , x(t) ∈ Ω, u(t) ∈ {0, 1} and v(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
Our main result is given in Proposition 1. It shows that an optimal strategy
for the seller is to deploy the two incentive programs for at most two distinct
time periods.
Proposition 1. 1. There exist τ1, τ2 (0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T ) such that u
∗(t) = 0
for τ1 < t ≤ τ2 and u
∗(t) = 1 else.
2. There exist τ3, τ4 (0 ≤ τ3 ≤ τ4 ≤ T ) such that v
∗(t) = 0 for τ3 < t ≤ τ4 and
v∗(t) = 1 else.
Proof. i(0) > 0 otherwise there is no problem to solve. Observe that Ω is pos-
itively invariant. Therefore a solution starting from any initial point x(0) ∈ Ω
remains confined to Ω. This allows us to disregard state constraints from the
control formulation.
Let u(t), v(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ∈ [0, T ] (This relaxation allows us to establish
existence of an optimal control. We show that the optimal controls are indeed
‘bang-bang’, i.e., u∗(t), v∗(t) ∈ {0, 1} for all t). Writing the problem in Mayer
form, it can be seen that the state space (appropriately expanded with additional
variables) is bounded and positively invariant (thus, state trajectories remain
bounded for all admissible pairs); and the system is affine in controls (see (7),
(4) and (5)). Existence of an optimal control is now established by Filippov-
Cesari theorem.
From (4), (5), and (7), the Hamiltonian is written as follows.
H(x,p, u, v) = −cu(β + ǫ1)ir − c
′v(α + ǫ2)i
−p1[(β + uǫ1)ir + (α+ vǫ2)i + γiθ + δi]
+p2[(β + uǫ1)ir + (α+ vǫ2)i] (8)
p := (p1, p2) denotes co-state variables. Then according to Pontryagin’s Maxi-
mum Principle, there exist continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable
co-state functions p1 and p2 that satisfy
p˙1 = −
∂H
∂i
= [cβ − (p2 − p1 − c)ǫ1]ru+ [c
′α− (p2 − p1 − c
′)ǫ2]v
+(p1 − p2)(βr + α) + p1(γ(1− 2i− r) + δ) (9)
p˙2 = −
∂H
∂r
= [cβ − (p2 − p1 − c)ǫ1)]ui+ (p1 − p2)βi − p1γi, (10)
at all t ∈ [0, T ] where u and v are continuous and satisfy the following
transversality condition
p∗1(T ) = 0, p
∗
2(T ) = 1. (11)
and also satisfy, for all t ∈ [0, T ], u(t) ∈ [0, 1] and v(t) ∈ [0, 1],
H(x∗(t), p∗(t), u∗(t), v(t)) ≥ H(x∗(t), p∗(t), u(t), v(t))
H(x∗(t), p∗(t), u(t), v∗(t)) ≥ H(x∗(t), p∗(t), u(t), v(t)).
(12)
From (8) and (12), we get the following form for controls.
u∗(t) =
{
1 if (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t)− c)ǫ1 > cβ
0 if (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t)− c)ǫ1 < cβ
(13)
v∗(t) =
{
1 if (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t)− c
′)ǫ2 > c
′α
0 if (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t)− c
′)ǫ2 < c
′α
(14)
In case of equality in the conditions specified in equations (13) and (14), u∗(t)
and v∗(t) may take any arbitrary values in [0, 1].
Let φ(t) := (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t)− c)ǫ1 − cβ and ψ(t) := (p
∗
2(t)− p
∗
1(t)− c
′)ǫ2 − c
′α.
We denote by H∗t the Hamiltonian along optimal state-control trajectory at
time t. The following lemma proves that Hamiltonian will always remain positive.
Lemma 1. H∗t > 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. From (8) and (11), we have
H∗T = [(1 − c)ǫ1 − cβ]i
∗(T )r∗(T )u∗(T )
+[(1− c′)ǫ2 − c
′α]i∗(T )v∗(T )
+(βi∗(T )r∗(T ) + αi∗(T ))
r(t) is non-decreasing whereas i(t) ↓ 0 and i(t) > 0 for all t since i(0) > 0.
Therefore, H∗T > 0. The conclusion follows by noting that the Hamiltonian is
constant for autonomous systems. ⊓⊔
The lemma below shows that the co-state variables remain positive for the
whole duration.
Lemma 2. p∗1(t), p
∗
2(t) > 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof. Suppose p∗1(t) ≤ 0 for all t and let p
∗
1(t) = 0 at t = τ (at least one τ exists
since p∗1(T ) = 0). Then p
∗
2(τ) > 0 otherwise H
∗
τ < 0 since u
∗(τ) = 0. Observe
from (9) that p˙1 < 0 if p1 = 0. Strict inequality in (13) implies that at τ , u
∗(·)
is continuous. Therefore, p˙1 < 0 in the neighborhood of 0. Thus p
∗
1(t1) ≤ 0
implies p∗1(t) < 0 for all t > t1 and p
∗
1(T ) 6= 0 which violates (11). It follows that
p∗1(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ). This in turn implies that p
∗
2(t) > 0 for all t otherwise
H∗t < 0. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. p∗2(t) > p
∗
1(t) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Suppose not. Let p∗2(t) < p
∗
1(t) at t = τ . Then φ(τ) < 0 and, therefore,
u∗(τ) = 0. (8) then yields H∗τ < 0, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Let ζ(t) := (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t))i
∗(t). The lemma that follows shows that ζ(t) is a
decreasing function.
Lemma 4. ζ˙(t) < 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. From (4), (9), and (10) we get
ζ˙(t) = −[c(ǫ1 + β)u
∗(t)r∗(t) + φ(t)u∗(t)i∗(t)
+c′(ǫ2 + α)v
∗(t)
+p∗2(t)(γ(1− i
∗(t)− r∗(t)) + δ)]i∗(t)
Lemma follows by noting that all terms inside the bracket are non-negative. ⊓⊔
Now consider φ˙(t). From (9), (10), and (8) we get
φ˙(t) = [
H∗t
i∗(t)
− φ(t)i∗(t)u∗(t)− (p∗2(t)− p
∗
1(t))βi
∗(t)]ǫ1
(p∗2(t) − p
∗
1(t))i
∗(t) is monotonically decreasing (Lemma 4). From (4) i∗(t) ↓ 0
exponentially (i∗(t) < i∗(0)e−(α+δ)t). H∗t is a positive constant (Lemma 1).
Assume that φ(t) = 0 at three points in time τ1, τ2, τ3. Therefore, φ˙(τ) > 0
for either τ = τ1 or τ = τ2. Without loss of generality, let us say φ˙(τ2) > 0. From
the above equation it follows that φ˙(τ3) > 0 which is not feasible as φ(τ
−
3 ) > 0.
It follows that φ(t) = 0 at at most two points in time. Therefore, there exist
0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T such that u
∗(t) = 1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1 and τ2 < t ≤ T , and 0
elsewhere.
Similarly, one can show that there exist 0 ≤ τ3 ≤ τ4 ≤ T such that v
∗(t) = 0
for τ3 < t ≤ τ4 and v
∗(t) = 1 otherwise. The proposition is, thus, established.
Proposition 1 implies that both the referral reward and direct incentives
programs are to be deployed at most twice for certain durations, one in the
beginning and the other at the end. It may happen that both the durations are
of length 0 which means that a program is not deployed at all. On the other
hand, it could also get deployed over the complete time horizon T . This gives a
simple and elegant marketing strategy which is easy to implement for the seller.
The structure of the above optimal control is quite intuitive. In the case of
the referral reward program, the cost is proportional to the product of number of
potential buyers and customers. Hence to keep the cost low, rewards are declared
in the initial stage (when the number of customers is less) to motivate product
advocates and may also be paid at the end (when the number of potential buyers
is less) to acquire some additional customers.
In the case of direct incentives, the cost is proportional to the number of
potential buyers. If the initial take rate for the product is less, this program may
get executed at initial stages to quickly acquire customers whose social influence
can be exploited in the later stages; otherwise more agents may buy competitor’s
product and attract other potential buyers. Towards the end of the campaign,
the number of potential buyers is less; hence direct incentives may be offered to
attract additional customers.
4 Numerical Results
The simple structure of optimal controls given by Proposition 1 allows one to
devise incentives programs quite easily by numerical optimization of τ ’s. Here we
obtain an independent validation of optimal controls by discretizing (7), casting
it as a nonlinear constrained optimization problem and using a gradient descent
approach to find an optimal solution. (For discussion on various numerical so-
lution techniques for such problems refer to [12]). For all our experiments, the
time horizon T and discretization step-size are fixed at 10 and 0.1 respectively.
The NLP formulation is not convex. Therefore, we use a multi-start mechanism
to determine an optimal solution. Results are also verified using the commercial
package PROPT which uses pseudospectral methods for solving such problems.
In this paper, we will primarily investigate the initial condition i(0) = 1.
This captures the case when the seller and the competitor(s) enter the market
with substitutable products at around the same time (e.g., gaming technologies)
or when the seller introduces an independent product into the market (e.g., a
book). Of course, similar results can be obtained for the case where seller and/or
competitor already have some presence in the market (r(0) > 0 and/or θ(0) > 0).
We fix ǫ1 = ǫ2 = 0.05, γ = 0.1, δ = 0.1 for all numerical studies, and
consider β = 0.1, α = 0.08, c = 0.25 and c′ = 0.3 as the base scenario (These
parameter values are arbitrary and only roughly based on some available data).
The optimal marketing strategy is shown in Figure 1. It is optimal for the seller
to run both the incentive programs initially for some duration, stop and then
run the programs again towards the end. Note that the optimal strategy is open
loop; hence estimates of i and r are not required for implementation.
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Fig. 1. Optimal marketing strategy for the base scenario
It is, thus, possible for the seller to determine the timing of her incentives
programs numerically. Experimentation with different values of pay-outs c and
c′ (which essentially fix ǫ1 and ǫ2) can be used to understand trade-offs and
optimize these pay-outs.
In the following we undertake an investigation of two important questions
pertaining to the interplay between the two incentives programs and the impact
of network structure on the them. The former question is important because
influence-and-exploit strategy has received much attention in the literature. As
we show below, exploit-and-influence strategy can also come into play for some
parameter settings. The second question is linked to the so-called influentials hy-
pothesis which informally says that high degree agents (hubs) play significant role
in product diffusion, and, therefore, are natural targets for incentives (direct or
referral rewards). We show that in some cases the seller is better off incentivizing
low degree agents (more than high-degree ones). Thus, our results highlight the
need for a careful consideration of the network structure while making incentive
decisions.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
D
ire
ct
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
Time
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R
ef
er
ra
l p
ro
gr
am
Direct incentives
Referral program
Fig. 2. Influence-and-exploit strategy is optimal when β is
increased to 0.13
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
D
ire
ct
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
Time
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R
ef
er
ra
l p
ro
gr
am
Direct incentives
Referral program
Fig. 3. Exploit-and-influence strategy is optimal when α is
increased to 0.09
4.1 Interplay between Referral and Direct Incentive Programs
When social influence is strong in the population, i.e., β is higher, the seller
needs to employ only direct incentives initially. For example, if β is set to 0.13
in the base scenario then it is optimal to offer referral rewards only at the end
and that too for a short period as shown in Figure 2. This can be seen as a
manifestation of the influence-and-exploit strategy. On the other hand, if the
seller has established a good reputation in the market, translating into a higher
value of α, an initial influence step through direct incentives may not even be
required. See from Figure 3 that when α = 0.09 in the base scenario, it is
optimal for the seller to offer direct incentives only at the end. In this case, for
most portion of the time horizon, the seller must exploit connections of existing
customers and only at the end must she impart direct influence on potential
buyers. We call it the exploit-and-influence strategy for the seller.
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Fig. 4. Influence-and-exploit strategy is optimal with pay-
outs: c = 0.3, c′ = 0.3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
D
ire
ct
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
Time
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R
ef
er
ra
l p
ro
gr
am
Direct incentives
Referral program
Fig. 5. Exploit-and-influence strategy is optimal with pay-
outs: c = 0.25, c′ = 0.35
We also observe from Figures 4 and 5 that influence-and-exploit and exploit-
and-influence are optimal strategies for the seller if she incurs high per conversion
pay-outs for referral and incentive programs respectively.
4.2 Impact of Network Structure on Incentive Programs
Real-world networks show strong degree correlation amongst connected nodes.
Some networks show assortative mixing of nodes by degrees where high-degree
nodes have most of their connections to other high-degree nodes. Others show
disassortative mixing where high-degree nodes have most of their connections
to low-degree nodes ([13]). In this section, we examine the impact of network
structure on incentives programs.
We consider an undirected correlated network with nodes belonging to either
of two classes A and B with probability P (A) and P (B) respectively. Class A
nodes are of high degree, say kA and class B nodes are of low degree, say kB.
P (A|B) is the probability that a given link from class B node points to a class
A node. P (B|A) can be computed from the following balance equation:
kAP (B|A)P (A) = kBP (A|B)P (B) (15)
We consider two types of network structures. One structure represents assor-
tative mixing whereas the other one represents disassortative mixing. To keep
things simple and derive key insights, we assume that the seller is optimizing im-
plementation of only one incentives program, namely, referral rewards program.
The seller can offer referral rewards to class A and/or class B nodes to increase
their social influence rate (β) by ǫ. As earlier, she incurs a per conversion cost
of c after normalizing with respect to product price.
We fix α = 0.1, δ = 0.1, β = 0.1, γ = 0.15, ǫ = 0.08, kA = 10, kB = 2, P (A) =
0.1, P (B) = 0.9 for our numerical studies. For disassortative network, we set
P (B|A) = 0.9 whereas for assortative network, we set P (B|A) = 0.1.
The optimal timing of referral reward program for disassortative network is
shown in Figure 6. The seller’s optimal strategy is to offer referral rewards to
class B nodes for the complete duration whereas rewards to class A nodes are
offered initially for a short duration and then again towards the end for a short
duration. In this case, class B nodes have almost half of their connections going
to class A nodes. Also, major fraction of the population is from class B. So,
referral rewards are offered to class B nodes for entire duration as it increases
influence not only on class B nodes but also on class A nodes. Class A nodes are
not rewarded for the entire duration in order to control the cost.
In the case of assortative network, the optimal strategy changes completely
(see Figure 7). The seller offers referral rewards to class A nodes for the complete
duration whereas rewards to class B nodes are offered initially for some duration
and then again towards the end. In this case, nodes from both the classes are
well connected amongst themselves with very few connections going across the
classes. So, the optimal reward strategies for both the classes are essentially
independent. For this particular scenario, it turns out that it is optimal to offer
rewards to class A nodes for the entire duration as the cost incurred is not much.
Whereas in the case of class B nodes, referral rewards are discontinued for some
duration in the middle as the cost overshoots the potential revenue.
The results show that networks with different structures can result in different
optimal strategies for the seller. In some scenarios, the seller may be better off
incentivizing low degree nodes as against the popular approach of targeting the
influentials (high degree nodes), thus, providing some support to the finding in
[14]. In some scenarios, the seller may be better off targeting influentials thus
supporting the results in [9]. Thus, our results highlight the need for a careful
consideration of the network structure while making incentive decisions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the problem of optimal timing of two incentive
programs, namely, direct incentives and referral rewards, for product diffusion
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Fig. 6. Optimal marketing strategy on a network with disas-
sortative mixing
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Fig. 7. Optimal marketing strategy on a network with assor-
tative mixing
through social networks. Taking a deviation from the existing approaches, we
formulate the problem as a continuous-time deterministic optimal control prob-
lem. The optimal strategy for the seller is to deploy these programs in at most
two distinct time periods. The simplicity of this structure and non-adaptive na-
ture makes them ideal for implementation in practice. We further show that if
the seller has good reputation in the market, exploit-and-influence strategy can
be optimal whereas if social influence is strong in the population, influence-and-
exploit strategy can be optimal for the seller. In the case of correlated networks,
our numerical studies show that the seller need not necessarily offer more fre-
quent referral reward programs to high degree nodes to maximize her profit.
There are two immediate directions for future work: (i) extend heterogeneity
of agents to include their external and social influence probabilities and (ii)
devise procedures to estimate model parameters.
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